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A LEGAL DILEMMA -
INJURY CAUSED BY PSYCHIC STIMULI
By SAM W. LOSLI*
This paper was awarded the 1963 Omar E. Garwood Memorial
Prize of $100 in a competition sponsored by the Association of
Colorado Claimants' Attorneys.
I. INTRODUCTION
• . . Our philosophy will tell us the proper function of
law in telling us the ends that law should endeavor to at-
tain; but closely related to such a study is the inquiry
whether law, as it has developed in this subject or in that,
does in truth fulfill its function-is functioning well or
ill .... 1
Laymen criticize the common law system as antiquated, obso-
lete, stagnate, and even unjust. In these days of ever changing
methods and ideas, phenomenally rapid increase in knowledge in
fields of science and medicine, society often grows impatient with
the slow moving common law and seeks more rapid changes in
legislatures of our country. Modern society is critical of anything
with its roots in the middle ages.2
Those who deal with the common law in their professions d6-
fend the system's slow change as being more certain, resting on
precedent after precedent like building a very strong and trust-
worthy castle. No attempt will be made here to defend or criticize
the common law system. Consideration will be limited to one small,
slow-moving area of our present day law that has been open to just
criticism by laymen and lawyer alike, viz., injury caused by psychic
stimuli.
Failure to move, to keep up with advances in science and medi-
cine, and even society itself, is not the sole basis for criticism in this
field of law, however. Another is the ugly stones of precedent used
in making a very unattractive castle.
Some courts were early in recognizing the mistaken premises
on which the earliest decisions refused damages for injury caused
by psychic stimuli, and others followed their lead, defending them-
selves by pointing out the broad statements and illogical conclu-
sions which make bad law. Finally, in 1961, the strongest of all
precedent against awarding damages for injury caused by fright was
replaced. New York's Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. 3 fell and in its place
Batalla v. State4 stands as a monument of the changing thought in
this confused field of law.5
New York is not the only state that has changed views on this
subject. The Mitchell case has been singled out only because of its
strong position for so many years, and because lawyers and pro-
fessors of law throughout the United States have used it as the
* June graduate, University of Denver College of Law.
1 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 112 (1924).
2 Pound, The Future of American Law, in Legal Methods and System, 97 (1950).
3 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
4 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
5 McCormick, Damages, 319-320 (1935).
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leading case for the rule of no award for injury caused by fright,
unaccompanied by bodily contact. By the time the Mitchell case was
overruled, however, it had become a light for a dwindling minority."
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The more we study law in its making, at least in its
present stages of development, the more we gain the sense
of a gradual striving toward an end, shaped by a logic
which, eschewing the quest for certainty, must be satisfied
if its conclusions are rooted in the probable. 7
Before 1880, the American courts had had few if any cases
before them presenting the question of injury by fright. This action,
historically, is based on allowance of redress for assault as a form
of trespass in early English law. "A, with the apparent means and
intention to commit a battery indulges willful conduct toward B or
a third person arousing in him a reasonable apprehension that the
threatened harmful or offensive touching will be carried forthwith
into impact. A is liable to B in damages for his assault."'
It is said that this earliest protection dedicated to mental tran-
quility seemingly "was to prevent assaults and consequently
breaches of the peace and did not represent judicial solicitude for
the psychic."9
As we review the development of this cause of action in Eng-
land and the United States, it should be noted that injury caused by
psychic stimuli or fear is so closely related to mental anguish situ-
ations that courts often confuse and relate the two. It does not seem
to be a great error, for injury caused by psychic stimuli is but one
step beyond mental distress-the injury being the product of severe
mental distress. However, fright may at times cause a direct physi-
cal injury because of a faint or panic, but these actions are in turn
related to severe mental distress. 10
The first case of record involving mental anguish related-to this
subject arose through an action for mental anguish and other dam-
ages, caused when the defendant seduced the plaintiff's daughter.
The court granted plaintiff's right to sue for these damages." In
Irwin v. Dearman, mentioned in Flemington v. Smithers,1 the court
limited damages for parents' mental distress caused by injury to
their child to situations where such damages arose from seduction
of their children. This is still the general rule, although courts are
beginning to realize that damages for injury caused to parents be-
cause of fear for their children should be given in some situations. 13
The next important case arose through a complaint of slander.
This is the celebrated case of Alsop v. Alsop.14 The plaintiff claimed
6 Burke, J. in Botalla v. State, supra note 4, said ". it is well to note that it [The
Mitchell case doctrine] hos been thoroughly repudiated by the English Courts which initiated it,
rejected by a majority of American jurisdictions, abandoned by many which originally adopted it,
and diluted, through numerous exceptions, in the minority which retained it." See also, 13 Syracuse
L. Rev. 176 (1961).
7 Supra note 1 at 70.
8 Smith, Relations of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30
Va. L. Rev. 193 (194).
9 Ibid.
10 See 64 A.L.R.2d 103, 104 (1959).
11 Chambers v. Irwin, 2 Selw, N.P. 1100 (1800).
12 2 Car. & P. 292, 172 Eng. Rep. 131 (K.B. 1826).
13 "The law appears to be moving in the direction of liability but thus far it clearly is limited
to the most extreme cases of violent attack, where there is an especial likelihood of fright or
shock, usually on the part of a woman." Prosser, Torts, 47 (2d ed. 1955).
14 5 H & N 534, 175 Eng. Rep. 1292 (Ex. 1860).
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that the defendant had falsely charged her with inconstancy and
when these reports, made to third persons, came to her attention,
she suffered nervous shock and mental illness severe enough to
require medical care. The Exchequer ruled there was no cause of
action because there was no legal precedent for such damages. If
the court would recognize sickness for special damage, this would
broaden liability for slander and make free speech more perilous,
lay a foundation for a new and novel claim, and besides, said the
court, illness for slander is not a natural consequence of defamation
and thus too remote.
15
In 1888, the case of Victorian R. Comm'r v. Coultas16 reached
the Privy Council, and was decided on the narrow point of injury
caused by fright produced by defendant's negligence. The case arose
in Canada, and the facts as stated are of some import. Coultas and
his sister, driving a horse and buggy, approached defendant's tracks.
The gatekeeper, an employee of defendant, allowed them to cross
over but a train was rapidly approaching. Upon seeing the train the
gatekeeper shouted for them to go back but Coultas directed the
gatekeeper to open the gate on the other side, which he did, and
Coultas got the buggy across the tracks just as the train went by,
narrowly missing the Coultas buggy. The sister suffered such fright
she became ill and sued the defendant for injuries occasioned by
this fright.
The Council, after considering the impossibility of such injury
caused by nervous shock arising from and as a consequence of the
gatekeeper's negligence and after finding no precedent for the
action stated that the difficulty which so often exists in cases of
alleged physical injuries of determining whether they were caused
by the negligent act, would be greatly increased, and a wide field
open for imaginary claims.1 7 Thus, this leading case was decided
mainly on the point of public policy.
It was upon the Coultas decision that New York based its own
conclusions in deciding Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra. In this
leading American case, the defendant's employee drove a streetcar
so negligently, that the horses drawing the car almost ran down
the plaintiff, finally stopping on either side of her, and frightening
her so badly she subsequently had a miscarriage. Plaintiff sued for
damages based on her injury caused by fright alone. The court held
15 Supra, note 8 at 195.
16 13 App. Cas. 222, 57 L. J. P. C. 69 (P.C. 1888).
17 Supra, note 8 at 197.
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that public policy, the "flood of litigation" theory, precluded an
action based solely on fright. The fear of feigned injury appears to
have been the final determining factor.
1 8
English law veered quickly away from the Coultas case rule,
but it was too late in the United States. The corner stone had been
placed and the building was being built upon it as quickly as fact
situations allowed. 9 However, in 1890, the highest court of Texas
listened to argument concerning another miscarriage. The case of
Hill v. Kimball20 was decided against the defendant, and the court
expressly rejected the Mitchell doctrine, initiating the rule that has
become the majority rule today.2 1 The plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendant, who knew of her advanced pregnancy and delicate health,
came into her yard and violently assaulted two Negroes, using pro-
fane language and drawing blood. As a result of his actions, plaintiff
became frightened and suffered a miscarriage.
The court said that although there was no legal precedent, it
was not a sufficient reason for denying recovery, and that there
could be no doubt that a physical injury might be produced through
a strong emotion of the mind; the fact that it was more difficult to
produce such an injury through mental operations than by direct
physical means afforded no sufficient ground for refusing compen-
sation where the injury was intentionally inflicted.
18 Supro, note 3.
19 Courts originally or still following the New York Rule: U.S. (There is some question) Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R. v. Gelvin, 238 Fed. 14 (8th Cir. 1916); But see Kaufman v. Western Union Tel., 224
F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 947.
Ark. St. Louis I.M. & S. R. R. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226, 86 Am. St. Rep. 206 (1901);
Ill. Braun v. Craven, 175 III. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898);
nd. Boston v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945);
Ken. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929);
Me. Herrick v. Evening Exp. Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 Ati. 16;
Moss. Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285. 47 N.E. 88 (1897);
Mich. Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich.
157, 192 N.W. 652 (1923);
Mo. Trigg v. St. Louis, K.C. & N.R.R., 74 Mo. 147 (1881);
N.J. Ward v. West Jersey & S.R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Ati. 561 (1900); Greenberg v. Stanley, 51
N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (1958);
Ohio Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R., 78 Ohio 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908);
Penn. Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955);
Va. Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932);
Wash. Stiles v. Pantages Theatre Co., 152 Wash. 626, 276 Pac. 112 (1929);
NOTE: Some of the above states do not follow the same rule in cases of willful wrong. See 64
A.L.R.2d 134.
20 76 Tex. Civ. App. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
21 Cases following Majority Rule are:
U.S. See footnote 19, supra;
Ala. Alabama F. & I. Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Calif. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952);
Conn. Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, 93 A.2d 292 (1952);
Go. Kuhr Bros., Inc. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954);
Kan. Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159Pac. 401 (1916);
La. Stewart v. Arkansas So. R.R., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676 (1904);
Md. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951);
Minn. Purcell v. St. Paul City R.R., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892);
Mont. Kelly v. Lowrey & Williams, Inc, 113 Mont. 385, 126 P.2d 486 (1942);
Neb. Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674, aff'd on rehearing 135 Neb. 232,
280 N.W. 890, (1938);
New Homp. Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950);
N.Y. Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961);
N. Car. Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936);
Ohio Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d 322 (1955) (overrules footnote 19, supra);
Oklahoma Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 195 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1952);
Ore. Salmi v. Columbia & N. Riv. R.R., 75 Ore. 200, 146 Pac. 819 (1915);
R.I. Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 Ati. 202 (1907);
S. C. Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958);
Tenn. Memphis St. R. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917);
Tex. Hill v. Kimball, note 20, supra; Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64
(1954);
Va. See note 15, supra;
Wash. See note 9, Supra, c.f. O'Meara v. Russell, 90 Wash. 557, 156 Pac. 550 (1916); Frazee
v. Westrn Dairy Prod., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935);
Wis. Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909); Colic v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d
594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
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III. MODERN APPROACHES
Recalling that the action for mental distress is closely related
to that for injury caused by fear, it is noteworthy that the American
courts have allowed damages in almost all situations where there
is injury or a contemporary tort upon which to attach the damages
for mental distress.
Generally, the rule today allows no recovery for mental distress
alone resulting from mere negligence. The courts, including those
following the minority rule in relation to injury caused by fear,
have made exceptions in certain fact situations allowing mental
distress damages to be a parasitic element, such as in a trespass on
plaintiff's person or property, a negligent physical injury, injury to
reputation, freedom of movement or right of privacy.
When there is contemporaneous injury, the courts do not sepa-
rate the injury from the mental distress. In other actions, mental
distress is an exception to the rule and independent of the action-
able tort, such as simple assault, invasion of property or breach of
contract; a special duty placed on public carriers requires even less
than simple assault to bring forth damages for mental distress.
22
The history of injury from psychic stimuli discussed in Section
II shows that the development of the action has not been strong or
certain. England adopted and then rejected the doctrine that no
award may be given. American courts rejected the rule in the ma-
jority of cases for allowing damages, but then shifted, and in doing
so, created the exceptions discussed above. Today, so many excep-
tions to the rule that mental distress is not actionable have been
created that it would seem that awarding mental distress damages
is the general rule, and the few situations where it is rejected, viz.,
where there is mental distress alone, caused by mere negligence of
the defendant, is the exception.
With the trend towards liberality in this field, the question
arises-what will Colorado do when the case comes before the
highest court? In analyzing the cases up to 1961, it might be con-
cluded that Colorado would follow the more conservative Mitchell
case, but since Mitchell has been overruled by the New York court,
and because of recent liberalization in its own thought, a more mod-
ern decision will probably be forthcoming.
Battalla v. State reflects the modern thought on this broad
field.2 3 The facts stated in that case were that infant plaintiff was so
frightened that she became hysterical when defendant's employee
failed to fasten and lock the belt on the chair lift in which plaintiff
had been placed. As a consequence of her fear, plaintiff suffered
injuries.
In the opinion by Judge Burke, all the arguments against
awarding damages were said to be of no effect any longer except
that of public policy. He discusses the case by eliminating the public
policy argument. Judge Burke first says: "Although fraud, extra
22 64 A.L.R.2d 103, 106.
23 New York has always been the leading state for not awarding damages, but they too have
decided to reject the rule of the Mitchell case. "It is undisputed that a rigorous application of its
rule would be unjust, as well as opposed to experience and logic. On the other hand, resort to
the somewhat inconsistent exceptions would mere y add further confusion to o legal situation
which presently lacks that coherence which precedent should possess." Battallo v. State, Supra note
4 at 730.
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litigation and a measure of speculation are, of course, possibilities,
it is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its jurisdiction."
Quoting from Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co.,24 the court says:
"The argument from mere expediency cannot commend
itself to a Court of justice, resulting in the denial of a logi-
cal legal right and remedy in all cases because in some a
fictitious injury may be urged as a real one." . . . It seems
that fraudulent accidents and injuries are just as easily
feigned in the slight-impact cases and other exceptions
wherein New York permits a recovery, as in the no-impact
cases which it has heretofore shunned....
The Mitchell case encourages claimants to perjure themselves,
and in itself causes excess litigation .. . Speculation of proof in
individual situations should not be the arbitrary bases upon which
to bar all actions.
In Colorado, we have as many exceptions to the rule of denying
damages for mental distress as most jurisdictions, and more than
some. Here, too, it has become the exception to deny damages for
mental distress.25 This is not a situation to be deplored, but one
which is typical of the times. It is known that mental distress of a
severe nature causes injury. It may take the form of injury caused
by slight trauma which in turn operates upon a psychoneurotic con-
dition, or it may take the form of injury from purely psychic
stimuli.
Where there has been impact of substantial nature, the Colo-
rado courts have always awarded damages for mental distress as an
element of damages. The cases are too numerous and the law so well
entrenched that citations are here omitted.
The courts have extended the rule to actions where there is but
slight impact but serious injury, the typical psychoneurotic case.
This is the area of tort law in which Judge Burke declares injuries
are questionable and as easily feigned as in the situation where
there is no impact.
Such a possibility existed in City of Denver v. Hyatt.26 The
plaintiff fell when she stepped into a hole in the boardwalk of a
city street. The immediate result of the fall was a sprained ankle
and a bruised back. Shortly afterwards she began suffering from
what doctors claimed was a diseased abdominal organ. Several phy-
sicians testified, two were appointed by the court. One physician
said that her internal condition was caused by the fall, another
testified that her condition could be traced to other reasons. The
first court-appointed physician said that such internal condition, as
far as he knew, could never be traced to such a fall. The court al-
lowed her damages, but added, that if the jury believed that her
injury was the result of a latent disease activated from the fall, she
might recover for the amount of aggravation. Finally, the court said,
The sidewalks of the city are for the use of those with
organic predisposition to disease as well as for the healthy
and robust, and any injury which the former may sustain
by reason of defects in such sidewalks, which result in ag-
24 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 Ati. 688, 692.
25 Judge Burke states that even the minority which has retained the rule of the Mitchell case
has diluted it with exceptions. Batalla v. State, supra note 4 at 730.
2628 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900).
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gravating an already diseased condition, are results for
which the city must respond if otherwise liable.
2 7
In Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. v. Marr'2 1 the court
allowed testimony to the effect that plaintiff was unable to do her
household duties or make large dinners, was losing her hair, getting
gray hair, melancholy, etc., but, stated that these were admissible
only to show physical condition after the accident and not for com-
pensation. However, the court also stated that if these damages
were specially pleaded, there might be compensation forthcoming.
29
In Colorado Springs and Interurban Ry. v. Nichols, 30 the court
allowed damages for plaintiff's neurasthenia allegedly caused by
being thrown from the seat of defendant's interurban railway car.
In this case, however, plaintiff did prove her miscarriage was a
result of the negligence and if neurasthenia developed as a result of
that unquestionably unhappy event, the chain of causation would
stem from defendant's negligence.
In the next case, the question was not whether there were dam-
ages, but whether it was error for the trial court to refuse defend-
ant's motion to subject plaintiff to a physical examination to de-
termine if the damages were permanent. In Western Glass Mfg. Co.
v. Schoeninger 3 1 the court held it to be error. Evidence indicated
that plaintiff's immediate injury was negligible. There was no visi-
ble injury nor at the time did the alleged injury inconvenience the
plaintiff. Two or more weeks after the injury the plaintiff consulted
a physician and upon statements of plaintiff and plaintiff's mother,
the physician diagnosed and treated the injury as Saint Vitus dance
with partial paralysis. After a month plaintiff returned to work as
before. A year later the physician examined plaintiff in order to
prepare himself to testify at the trial. It was claimed that plaintiff
would have recurring attacks of paralysis for life. These facts seem
to indicate a psychoneurotic condition which at most was aggra-
vated by the injury, yet the court did not consider this point in its
decision.
Perhaps the most obviously psychoneurotic situation is seen in
Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. v. Allen.3 2 As plaintiff was
alighting from an electric streetcar, she claims the car gave a jerk
which in turn subjected her to injury to her spinal column, nervous
system, circulation and general health. According to the testimony,
plaintiff's exclamations of pain did not begin for several months
after the accident. The trial court instructed the jury as to damages
saying:
In arriving at the amount of your verdict, you may
take into consideration the nature and character of the
injuries, the mental, physical pain if any, she has suffered
or will suffer as the proximate result of such injuries.
33
Again there was no discussion of the possible aggravation of an
27 Id. at 139, 63 Pac. at 406.
28 26 Colo. App. 48, 141 Poc. 142 (1914).
29 Injuries were incurred when plaintiff was knocked to the ground while alighting from the
electric car.
30 41 Colo. 272, 92 Pac. 691 (1907).
31 42 Colo. 357, 94 Pac. 342 (1908).
3248 Colo. 4, 108 Pac. 990 (1910).
33 Id. at 11, 108 Pac. at 993.
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already existing neurotic condition; there was merely an acceptance
of the claims as plaintiff made them.
Finally, in Parker v. City & County of Denver, 4 where plain-
tiff was injured on a faulty sidewalk, suffering minor injuries at
the time but severe later effects, the court held she had a valid
claim for damages. But when plaintiff fell through the trap door in
defendant's kitchen and brought an action for damages suffered as
a result of appendicitis, the court drew the line, saying the claim
was too remote.
35
In reciting these cases to the reader, it is not to be implied that
the plaintiffs should not receive compensation for their injuries and
the mental distress suffered at the time and as a result of the in-
juries. It is meant to point out that such slight traumatic stimuli
causing severe injury results in a claim for substantial damages in
all of the above cases. Colorado has long given such damages to
plaintiff, but for many years indicated that it would not allow
plaintiff substantial damages for mere psychic stimuli resulting in
injury.
36
In the case of a slight traumatic injury, the sarcasm that the
true measure of defendant's damages is hindsight rather than fore-
sight is a fact. The test of foreseeability is completely neglected in
most cases, and once the defendant's action has been connected to
the injury suffered by plaintiff, the door is thrown open to any re-
34 128 Colo. 355, 262 P.2d 553 (1953).
35 Burnside v. Peterson, 43 Colo. 382, 96 Pac. 256 (1908).
36 Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 1511 (1913).
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sulting claim within reason. Thus a five dollar touch becomes a five
thousand dollar claim.
3 7
Hubert Winston Smith and Harry C. Solomon, in their article
Traumatic Neuroses in Court, have divided injury actions into three
groups, perhaps over-simplifying the situation."
1. Those cases where there is slight stimuli, causing great harm.
This group is made up of those suffering from a pre-existing neu-
rotic condition, upon which the slight stimulus operates, causing
more harm than would have been caused in the average constituted
person.
2. Those cases where there has been a great stimulus, either
trauma, or psychosyncratic, and has resulted in injury. These cases
are made up of the average constituted person who would have been
injured by such stimulus.
3. Those borderline cases which do not clearly fall in either
class. This is the clincher, for these cases are those that cause courts
most trouble, and, because of the difficulty in proof, have resulted
in the Mitchell rule when psychic stimuli alone is involved.
39
Although the authors state that these groups can be easily
divided, it is impossible to separate them clearly for each group
must blend into the other like different shades of whites, grays and
blacks.
In the same article, the authors state:
It may also be accepted as true that all individuals have
some tendency or capacity to worry, to be fearful, to be
concerned, and that all have some psychoneurotic mani-
festations. This is much like saying that no one is free of
some fear or bodily pathology, but not thereby ill.
40
Thus, if it is true that all persons have some tendency to psy-
choneurotic manifestations, we can see that the degree and com-
plexities of the stimuli working upon the individual, the amount of
predisposition towards a psychoneurotic condition, and the severity
of the stimuli, whether traumatic or psychic, all contribute to the
amount of resulting injury. This cause and effect phenomena can
more easily be understood by a quotation from Law and Medicine.
All neurotic phenomena are based on insufficiencies of
the normal control apparatus. They can be understood as
involuntary emergency discharges that supplant the normal
ones. The insufficiency can be brought about in two ways.
One way is through an increase in the influx of stimuli;
too much excitation enters the mental apparatus in a given
unit of time and cannot be mastered; such experiences are
called traumatic ....
However, the expression 'too high' is a relative one; it
means beyond the capacity of mastery. This capacity de-
pends on constitutional factors as well, as on all of the indi-
vidual's previous experiences. There are stimuli of such
overwhelming intensity that they have a traumatic effect
on anyone .... 41
37 Prosser, Torts 179 (2d ed. 1955).
38 Smith and Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 Va. L. Rev. 87 (1943).
39 Id. at 107-109.
40 Ibid.
41 Curran, Low and Medicine 290 (1960).
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The cause-effect described above is just the beginning of the
eventual injury caused by the slight trauma or by the psychic
stimuli. There develops a small difference in causation between the
psychic stimuli resulting in injury and the minor traumatic experi-
ence which results in serious injury, after the phenomena described
above. Smith calls the phenomena a focal experience. The devel-
opment of the neurosis which is the visible injury seen by the court
and jury may develop in a matter of minutes, hours, weeks, or
even months.
From this very limited discussion it is possible to determine
that psychic stimuli and minor traumatic impact resulting in severe
incapacity have similar causes. However, it should be noted that
there are situations where there is no causal connection between
stimulus and neurosis because the injury was very severe or the
psychic stimulus extremely harrowing. The usual case operates in
the same way as the minor impact case. The stimuli, either psychic
or traumatic, operates on a neurotic condition and causes serious
injury or even disease. The legal difference is that in the jurisdic-
tions where the minority rule expounded in the Mitchell case is fol-
lowed, the minor impact results in an award for the plaintiff, while
the severe psychic stimuli gives none. As can be seen by the above
cases, Colorado has awarded damages for injuries resulting from
minor impact; it is difficult to see why it will not in the future
award damages for psychic stimuli.
The general rule for awarding damages for mental anguish
when the plaintiff has suffered a contemporaneous injury allows
courts and juries to consider fright at the time of the injury, appre-
hension as to its effects, nervousness, or humiliation at disfigure-
ment. However, Colorado has placed some arbitrary lines in the
area of apprehension as to its effects and humiliation at disfigure-
ment. In this area, Colorado seems to be extremely conservative,
or at least so in the past.
In Diamond Rubber Co. v. Harryman,42 when the lower court
allowed damages for mental suffering arising from disfigurement of
the plaintiff, the supreme court held:
No rule for awarding damages for mental suffering, how-
ever caused can be formulated so as to define a certain basis
upon which such damages can be estimated. This is espe-
cially true with respect to mental suffering .resulting from
disfigurement. The cases in which damages should be al-
lowed, if recoverable at all, should be confined to the nar-
rowest possible limits, where it was evident that a claim
therefor was meritorious.
43
The door has been left slightly open. The major premise upon
which the court bases its decision for declining damages is under-
lined, and points out that it is the same rule for which damages
for fright causing injury was rejected in so many jurisdictions be-
fore the trend towards liberalization. It should be noted, however,
that where there is an element of maliciousness or willfulness, the
Colorado court follows the general rule.
In Gerick v. Brock,44 plaintiff brought action for damages re-
42 41 Colo. 415, 92 Pac. 922 (1907).
43 Id. at 420-21, 92 Pac. at 926.
44 120 Colo. 394, 210 P.2d 214 (1949).
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sulting from a personal assault by defendant. The defendant al-
legedly pushed the plaintiff from defendant's car when the injured
man attempted to prevent the defendant from using the car. The
plaintiff suffered numerous wounds about the head and body and
a double fracture of his right leg. These injuries resulted in further
suffering by the plaintiff, some of which must have been thought
imaginary by the jury because it awarded only a fraction of what
the plaintiff asked. The court allowed the plaintiff damages for
nervous shock, physical and mental pain and anguish endured as a
result of the injuries "together with such as will necessarily endure
in the future ...."
A further differentiation was specified by the court in Denver
City Tramway Co. v. Martin.45 Plaintiff was injured when defend-
ant's tramway car hit the surrey in which she was riding. The
court said:
In a case of this character we are inclined to the opin-
ion that the rule established by the cases cited is, that any
physical and mental suffering attending or arising from
the injury received may be regarded as a part of the injury,
and as such, a proper subject of compensation; but injured
feelings which might arise in the mind, resulting from the
injury, not being a part of the pain naturally attending the
injury, cannot be regarded as an element of damages.
4
The court lists as mental distress caused by injured feelings that
mental pain and suffering caused by mortification, humiliation as a
result of a maimed, disfigured or crippled body. Since this case was
decided one year after the Diamond Rubber case, it may be con-
cluded that it is further amplification of the previous rule. However,
it seems broad enough to exclude injury caused by psychic stimuli
if the court continues to follow it.
A case more closely related to the question presented in this
paper arose in Grant v. Gwynn.47 Plaintiff Gwynn brought action
for assault and battery, requesting damages for injury and exem-
plary damages. Defendant Grant denied and counterclaimed for
mental distress, alleging that disturbances created by Gwynn over
a period of time damaged her personal and business reputation
and caused her to suffer shock and mental distress. The court re-
jected this claim saying:
We consider first the question of whether the court
erred in dismissing the two claims incorporated in the coun-
terclaim of Grant. With reference to the first claim the
trial court stated, in denying the motion for new trial:
"..... there is no claim stated. There never was any breath
of life in that claim." In essence, it is a claim arising
from alleged emotional disturbance resulting from alleged
threats and "annoying" conduct attributed to Gwynn which
caused "mental distress" in the mind of Grant, over a
period of time (not specified) prior to the incident which
forms the basis for Gwynn's complaint. 48
45 44 Colo. 324, 98 Pac. 836 (1908).
46 Id. at 338, 98 Poc. at 841.
47 365 P.
2
d 256 (Colo. 1961).
48 Id. at 259.
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There, the mental distress was not caused by immediate fear of
injury, nor by one severe psychic stimulus, but by many acts over
a period of time. This would seem to cause a condition bordering
on worry, rather than fear; there is some difference in the conno-
tation of the words but both come under the general heading of
mental distress. Although the court would not accept the fact
that injury could result from mental distress over a period of
time, this is a much more common phenomena than injury through
fright, although both reactions are well known and documented at
this date. Curran states that the stress of life plays an immense
role in the development of neurotic illness, 49 and Smith, in his
much mentioned article, states that repeated mental distress re-
actions are more likely to cause physical injury than one such
stimulus.50
Other cases have stated a similar rule to that expressed in
Grant, however, and those courts which award damages for injury
caused by fear wrongfully caused by defendant seem to limit the
situation to fear or severe psychic stimuli.
51
In Grant v. Gwynn,52 the court refused to accept defendant's
theory. We cannot tell what evidence the defendant was able to
produce, but it seems strange that the court was so dogmatic in
refusing damages when it has been quite liberal in allowing mental
distress damages resulting from breach of contract or damages
based on similar actions.
The type of mental distress causation is the same, i.e. mental
distress bordering on worry, which in turn reacts upon the neurotic
disposition of the individual to produce injury.
A key to this puzzle may be found in Hall v. Jackson.5 3 This
case is often quoted in cases containing elements of mental distress
claims, whether the claims relate to physical injury or contract.
The court limited its decision to an action for breach of contract,
against a defendant not engaged in business of a quasi-public
nature, to recover substantial damages founded only upon mental
anguish, humiliation and distress of mind. The breach was un-
attended by physical injury to the party bringing the action. There
49 Note 41 supra, at 288.
50 Note 38, supra, at 90.
51 C.f. Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937) Damages were allowed on
showing a fear, but court stated worry would not bring forth the same judgment.
52 Note 47 supra.
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was an absence of wanton or willful conduct on the part of the
breaching party.
In a further analysis of the rule for awarding damages for
mental distress, the court makes three classifications of cases.
a. In cases of pure tort, where no contractual relation
exists and the acts complained of are attended with will-
ful and wanton conduct on the part of defendant, sub-
stantial damages may be recovered for mental anguish
and suffering only, though no physical injury or pecu-
niary losses (are) suffered by plaintiff.
b. In cases where a breach of contract has occurred and the
acts attending such breach are accompanied by willful,
insulting or wanton conduct of the one guilty of the
breach, substantial damages may be recovered for mental
suffering only.
c. In cases where a breach of contract has taken place and
the one committing the breach was not engaged in busi-
ness of a quasi-public nature, and the negligence con-
sisted of a mere passable breach, unintentional, and un-
accompanied by any acts of wantoness, willfulness or
insult, on the part of the one committing the breach, an
action for substantial damages, founded alone upon men-
tal anguish and suffering, cannot be sustained; the rule
stated being predicated, of course, upon the absence of a
statute on the subject.
5 4
In the above classifications the situation of injury caused by
fright because of defendant's mere negligence is conspicuously
absent. Nor is it included in further classifications listed by the
court where damages for mental anguish may be given.
Mental distress damages may be awarded where:
1. By the merely negligent act of the defendant, physical
injury has been sustained, and in this class of cases they
are compensatory and the reason given for their allow-
ance is that the one cannot be separated from the other.
2. Breach of marriage contract.
3. In the cases of willful wrong especially those affecting
the liberty, character, reputation, personal security or
domestic relations of the injured party.55
The court then added that if the people of the state think it is
wise for damages for mental distress for other than those reasons
listed above be given, they should urge the legislature to take
action.
It was twelve years before the Hall case was broadened. In
1925, Westesen v. Olathe State Bank,56 plaintiff brought action for
damages for breach of contract stating that defendant bank agreed
to lend the plaintiff money for a trip to-California by crediting his
account with such sums as he might need after reaching his des-
tination. When plaintiff arrived in California, defendant refused to
honor his checks. The trial court permitted damages for humilia-
tion and mental suffering, and defendant brings error.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 78 Colo. 217, 240 Pac. 689 (1925).
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The supreme court distinguished the Hall case and, quoting
from 17 C.J. 828, said:
Mental pain and suffering in connection with a wrong
which apart from such pain and suffering constitutes a
cause of action is a proper element of damages where it is
the natural and proximate consequence of the wrong.
5 7
Thus, the court broadened the contract classification to include
situations where there was a wrong, which produced mental an-
guish even though there existed no willful or wanton conduct.
Two later cases, Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n5s and
McCreery v. Millers Groceteria Co.,5 9 were decided reaffirming that
Colorado would allow damages for mental distress caused by
breach of contract when such breach was accombanied by willful
or wanton conduct. This rule was stated in the Hall case, supra, as
classification two. However, the court stated further that even if the
breach was not of willful or wanton nature, nominal damages could
be awarded for mental distress caused by the breach. This latter
statement would seem to limit the rule laid down in the Westesen
case to nominal damages rather than substantial damages.
Colorado has limited damages in wrongful death actions to
pain and suffering of the deceased caused by the injury, but those
suffered by the survivors of the deceased are not compensable. 60
Finally, Colorado allows substantial damages for mental distress
caused by willful insulting language of employees of common
carriers. Such special burden placed upon the common carrier is
the general rule,61 and courts go far in following it. This may be
demonstrated by Bleeker v. Colorado & So. R.R.62 in which the
court stated that it was basing its decision on breach of contract,
but insinuated that common carriers have a special duty to those
depending on its service and thus are placed in a special category
for breach of common courtesy.
The action was brought for damages for mental suffering
caused by insulting language of the conductor. The court first
established the duty of a carrier to the plaintiff which, the court
said, "included protection against the misconduct of employees."
In refuting the defendant's claim that damages cannot be given
for misconduct of employees, the court stated:
For a breach of the contract of carriage as the result of
a conductor assaulting a passenger without provocation,
the authorities are practically unanimous in holding that
for insulting language caused in connection with the as-
sault, damages for mental suffering caused thereby may
be recovered. If damages are recoverable for a breach of
the contract in one instance, there is no good reason why a
breach of such contract, as the result of using insulting
57 Id. at 219, 240 Pac. 690.
58 In Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932), plaintiff con-
tracted with defendant mortuary to bring plaintiff's deceased husband's body from Walden to
Denver and prepare it for burial. There was to be no publicity or notoriety. Defendant took pictures
of the body being unloaded from the airplane and published it in two newspapers.
59 In McCreery v. Miller's Groceteria Co., 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1937), plaintiff brought
action for damages resulting from defendant's unauthorized use of plaintiff's photograph for
advertising purposes, after plaintiff expressly told defendant it could not be used.
60 See Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1951).
61 Prosser, Torts, 40-41 (2d ed. 1955).
6250 Colo. 140, 114 Pac. 481 (1911).
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language, should not give a right of action independent of
other acts which may constitute a breach.
63
This case was decided before Hall v. Jackson, supra, but con-
tains much more liberal ideas. Perhaps, if the court would have
continued in the vein of thought expressed by the court in the
above case, i.e., "damages resulting from mental suffering . . . are
difficult of ascertainment, but the same is true in a greater or lesser
degree, in all actions brought to recover unliquidated damages,"
Colorado could have been placed among the more modern courts
in this field long before now.
IV. PROJECTION
No case involving injury by fright has reached the Supreme
Court of Colorado so it is necessary to hypothesize what Colorado
will do when the court does have such a case by drawing indica-
tions from cases in related fields. This is difficult when the court
seemingly takes a step forward and then a half step backward.
It leads to confusion and uncertainty, but Colorado is not alone
in this. 64
in 1911, the Colorado Supreme Court decided Hall v. Jackson,
supra, following the majority rule at that time, i.e., there could
be no award for injury resulting from mental distress (fright)
unless there was physical impact. Today, the rule followed in
that 1911 case is no longer the majority rule, nor is it an equitable
rule. as science has advanced to such a remarkable refinement
that there can generally be little doubt that physical injury may
be caused by fright.
The supreme court has recognized this development in medical
knowledge which resulted in a change in legal thought on the
subject in the recent case of Valley Development Co. v. Weeks.6 5
Although the facts of the case indicated that plaintiff should not
be awarded damages for her mental distress which allegedly caused
her injury, the court, in a very lengthy and detailed decision by
Mr. Justice Sutton, discusses the changing law in relation to award-
ing damages for injury caused by mental distress. 6 After pointing
out that the case in issue, which involved trespass on property,
not person, fell without the three classifications in the Hall case,
the court stated:
Hall also points out that "It may be said with safety
that at common law no action could be maintained to re-
cover for mental suffering in the absence of bodily injury
occasioning such suffering." The law has moved from that
position far forward today as the authorities referred to
testify.
67
Although this decision insists on staying within the ancient rules
laid down in the Hall case, it does indicate the court may not
63 Id. at 146, 114 Pac. at 483.
64 "The case law in the field here treated is in an almost unparalleled state of confusion and
any attempt at a consistent exegesis of the authorities is likely to break down in embarrassed
perplexity." 64 A.L.R.2d 103.
65 147 Cola. 591, 364 P.2d 730 (1961).
66 Plaintiff brought action against the Development Co. for deprivation of plaintiff's right to
water from a ditch that hod run across defendant's land before development. The court allowed
compensation for actual damage but found that plaintiff's mental distress stemmed from an earlier
condition.
67 Note 65 supra at 599, 364 P.2d at 734.
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believe that in situations where injury resulted from fright, it
would follow that case.
Why have the courts departed from that rule which denies
damages in such situations? Our discussion to this point indicates
that there are many situations today similar to the one where
injury results from fright, and where the courts have for many
years given substantial damages. Now we shall look specifically
at the reasons for the change in courts' reasoning in relation to
this field of personal right actions.
A careful and revealing analysis of the Coultas and Mitchell
cases was done by Hubert Winson Smith.68 He feels that there are
three basic reasons for refusing damages. (1) That since fright
caused by negligence is not itself a cause of action, none of its
consequences can give rise to a cause of action, (2) that the dam-
ages resulting from fright are too remote, and (3) that it is con-
trary to public policy to allow recovery of damages for personal
injuries resulting from fright.6 9
This same reasoning was used in Hall v. Jackson, supra. An
analysis of these reasons, however, shows certain weaknesses
which should be overcome.
The first reason appears to run afoul of the maxim "for every
wrong, a remedy." It is settled that when a bodily injury occurs
as a result of another's negligence, all resulting mental and physical
damage is compensable. Why, then, when the injury occurs solely
through mental distress should a cause of action be precluded?
In answer to the second reason, medical authorities say such
damages are not remote. Laboratory experiments and observa-
tions over fifty years, including two world wars and the Korean
war have established to a certainty that there is an essential inter-
relationship between physical organisms and the mental or emo-
tional. Thus, severe shock to one reacts upon the other.
70
When an individual is subject to a severe psychic stimulus,
physical lesions or functional disorders are actually produced.
68 Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30 Va. L. Rev. 200, 206 (1944).
69 Smith, op. cit. supra at 215.
70 Id. at 217. (Some authorities disagree.)
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This is especially true when occurring over a period of time. The
article by Hubert W. Smith lists7' systems or organs of the body
known at that time to react physiologically to a single stimulus
resulting in fear and rage. The two emotions are listed together
because they react upon the mental and physical systems similarly
and to the same degree. Also listed are 12 different recognized dis-
eases that might be caused by such a stimulus along with symptoms
which in turn might develop into other diseases.
Besides these physiological ailments, an individual may develop
psychological disturbances which result in physiological complaints.
These may eventually develop into actual physiological ailments.
Dr. Winfred Overholser speaks of these ailments after discussing
the possibility of direct effect upon the physical and organic sys-
tems.
There is a considerable group of disturbances of per-
sonality, however, in which we now consider the causation
to be primarily psychologic. This includes the entire group,
for example, of what are known as the neuroses or the psy-
choneuroses . . . . As for physical symptoms of neurosis,
they are legion. There may be anesthesia (loss of sensation),
blindness or deafness, loss of voice (aphonia), or paralysis
in what is known as the conversion type of neurosis, for-
merly referred to as hysteria. There may, too, be tremors,
or even attacks of unconsciousness with convulsions. In the
conversion neurosis, it is usually the sensory or motor sys-
tems which are affected. In others of the neuroses the
alimentary system is predominantly affected instead, so
that we may find painful symptoms referable to almost any
system of the body such as the gastro-intestinal tract,
the circulatory or genito-urinary sysem, the skin, and so
on .... The importance of this group of symptoms in the
so-called traumatic neuroses, that is neuroses which ap-
pear at least to have been precipitated by a physical injury,
or an emotional shock, is considerable. It should not be
thought that merely because the symptom, painful or
otherwise is psychologically determined, it is imaginary,
or non-existent. The complaints are painfully real; they
do not respond well to physical treatment, except so far as
that is suggestive therapy, but call for psychologic treat-
ment instead.
72
Laboratory experiments have discovered that actual lesion
may develop from psychic stimuli. Skin diseases, ulcers, blisters
etc. may develop.73 How, then, with this scientific evidence, can
a court of law decide that any damage is not the direct result of
psychic stimuli?
Perhaps the most difficult barrier for the courts to hurdle
before awarding damages for injury caused by psychic stimuli
is public policy. The difficulty lies in understanding the courts'
reasoning when a decision is made to rest upon public policy.
Here there may be real justification for barring damages on
public policy grounds.
71 Ibid.
72 Overholser, The Psychiatrist and the Law, 29-30 (1953).
73 Smith, op. cit. supra at 213.
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Judge Black of Indiana said:
We think it cannot be properly said that such injuries
are imaginary or conjectural or that the sufferings de-
scribed are not real nor does it seem to us proper today
that they cannot be regarded as directly and naturally re-
sulting from the act of the defendant as their proximate
cause, but not every injurious effect of wrong can form
the basis of damage.
Many ill consequences follow from wrongs which prox-
imate effect for which the law cannot afford redress be-
cause of the inadequacies of methods and means of courts
to reach just and adequate results with sufficient certainty.
74
Judge Black speaks of the difficulty of proof; but there are
other reasons for which public policy is said to prevent awarding
damages for injury by fright. The question must be raised as to
how far the courts should extend the cause of action: to third
persons, to anyone within hearing distance of the accident, or to
only the immediate persons involved in the action?
These questions have been answered satisfactorily to the ma-
jority of the courts in some manner. In Colorado, many of the
answers can be seen in procedure and past decisions in related
fields. Judges and juries alike have been determining injuries
from slander, converting them into money awards, and doing a
satisfactory job for hundreds of years under our common law
system. The usual phrase used is: "Relief is not to be denied be-
cause the exact amount cannot be ascertained. ' '75 It is also doubtful
that, today, a plaintiff could successfully feign injuries of this
nature.
76
The final question raised by the public policy argument is
whether "the flood gates of litigation" will be opened. In the first
place, as said in the Battalla case, such a reason should not be used to
bar an individual with a rightful claim.7 7 In the second place, the for-
mula of proof in all negligence actions would seem adequate to
prevent such a flood of litigation from becoming so overwhelming.
The plaintiff in a civil action has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of substantial evidence the concurrent existence of
four terms of the formula: duty, dereliction, direct or proximate
causation and damages. Any one of these four, if found lacking,
will defeat plaintiff's cause. If the courts open the door to an action
for damages caused by fright, it does not have to throw open the
door to all claims based on such fright unless these four elements
are present. No one has gone so far as to recommend that every
person has a right not to be emotionally disturbed. Of course our
modern day pace of living would not permit such a recommenda-
tion, but surely it would not deny an individual who has a genuine
claim, based upon defendant's proven negligency, a deserving
remedy.
74 Kolen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R. Co., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N.E. 694, 63 Am.St.Rep. 343 (1897).
75 Bullerdick v. Pritchard, 91 Cola. 276, 8 P.2d 705 (1932). See also Nebraska Drillers Inc. v.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 123 F. Supp. 678, 682 (1953); Southern Colo. Power Co. v. Pestana,
80 Colo. 375, 251 Pac. 224, (1926).
76 Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as -Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 509. See also,
Bohlon, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1961).
77 Botalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1961).
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V. CONCLUSION
Justice is the constant desire and effort to render every
man his due.
Justinian
This paper, of necessity leaves many questions unanswered.
How far should the doctrine of damages for injury caused by fright
be expanded? Should all within a certain circle of danger be al-
lowed to bring an action against the negligent actor? Should a
parent be awarded damages for fright caused by fear for his child
in turn caused by the negligent act of defendant? These questions
are being answered in courts of the United States and England
today, but would require another paper to discuss properly.78
Medical science is not a certain science today, and of course
there will be many times when doctors disagree as to proximate
causation of plaintiff's injury; this is not a new dilemma to courts.
That the problem has arisen in our courts today, as a result of
not allowing damages for injury caused by frights, is also of imme-
diate consequence, tending to minimize any problem that arises
as a result of embarrassing the doctrine. Besides the inequity to
the injured plaintiff caused by fear alone, in other situations courts
look for the smallest trauma to base the defendan's action upon,
and upon finding it, often allow an uncalled for amount of damages.
This is as unjust as not allowing any damages at all.
Finally, it is not only proven that psychic stimuli causes in-
jury in some cases, it is also proven that there are some individuals
predisposed to this type of injury to a greater extent than others.
Should a cracked vase be worth as much as a whole one? Perhaps,
foreseeability is the answer to this question, but proof is another
that should be taken into consideration on the part of defendant.
Some have said that courts should use the average man to
determine if the psychic stimuli would have caused the injury and
to what extent damages should be awarded. 79
Thus, it cannot be said that there are no problems involved
in this field any longer. That would be hypocritical and show a
severe case of naivete.
However, courts are being hypocritical in not allowing a plain-
tiff a cause of action in deserving situations, and narrow in ignoring
medical advancements, new theories and trends in law.
78 See 18 A.L.R.2d 221.
79 Courts should also keep in mind the difference between activating a latent disease, and
compounding a present disease or condition.
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